Variable Geometry: Navigating our Way through Evolving Dynamics of International Relations

The dynamics of international cooperation are changing; the multilateral model inherited from the post-World War II era is in crisis; new forms of collaboration are emerging. These themes were echoed by heads of state and of government from across the world at the recent World Economic Forum. In this context, it is helpful to think beyond the – often assumed – dichotomy between on the one hand, fatalists preaching the end of an era and calling for the abolition of multilateral institutions on grounds of their dysfunctionality, and on the other hand, conservationists stubbornly clinging to an exclusionary system that the global community is already moving beyond. Let us first contemplate the state of multilateral institutions of international relations today, before investigating both of the above positions and their shortcomings. Thereafter, let us consider a countervailing perspective on the current institutional landscape of international relations.

The dominant model through which international relations are done today – multilateralism – is undeniably in crisis. The numerous criticisms of the model coalesce around two main concerns: structural inequality and political impotence, with the latter stemming in part from the former. In order to understand their coming under fire today, we must first recognize the very origins of the multilateral organizations of international relations.

The problem of structural inequality

Institutions constituting the multilateral order such as the United Nations (UN), BRICS, OSCE, the EU, human rights and trade conventions to name a handful are far from neutral. The UN (successor to the League of Nations) is a prime example of this: established at the closure of the Second World War, it institutionalized the power relations of that period. As the saying goes, the victors write the rules. The UN’s very own security council, the organ with the greatest executive authority, concentrates power through the veto right of its five permanent members[1] (China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America[2]) while relegating all other member-states to punctual, rotational representation[3]. This arrangement accords advantaged positions to select states and leaves most to grasp at fleeting periods of representation in a zero-sum struggle. For the majority of UN member-states, one state’s residence on the security council entails the exclusion of another. The UN is thus structurally unequal. Its rules do not allow, or indeed even aspire to equal standing of its members.

The problem of political impotence

This leads us to the second axis of critique of the multilateral model: that of political impotence. This inability for multilateral institutions to enforce their own edicts is evident through the responses of these institutions towards Russian aggression in Ukraine, Israeli attacks on neighboring countries, and US warmongering in Iran.

Imperialist interventions and repeated violations of international law by greater powers (and those supported by them) systematically go unpunished. For an institution championing world peace and boasting itself protector of human rights[4], the UN has been remarkably reticent to take a decisive stance on ongoing geopolitical upheavals. Inaction in the face of ongoing genocides and the transgressions of member-states betrays its impotence. Only recently, the UNSC permanent members’ veto power has been mobilized by the USA to block draft resolutions of ceasefire in Palestine[5] and maintain impunity of Israël’s and its own war crimes (thus designated by the International Criminal Court’s[6]). Critics denounce selective enforcement of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

We can only conclude that the UN’s capacity for action is limited by the interests of major powers. Moreover, it is apparent that the tremendous expenses needed to sustain the UN’s functions do nothing to resolve its inefficacy. That the institution has little to show for the financial burden incumbent on member-states has prompted even the most politically privileged within it (i.e. the US) to pull back[7].

These two axes of criticism – the structural inequality of the system and its inefficacy – are deeply related. The institutionalized domination of certain (powerful) states (as seen through the example of the UNSC) reinforces the institutions’ incapacity to hold them accountable. Resulting of the interaction of these two dysfunctionalities is a practiced double standard through which violation of the commonly edified principles is systematically ignored for some few states, and habitually rebuked, sanctioned for the rest. In practice this system institutes a ruling “law of the strongest”, which intervenes and overpowers the formal equality of the rule-based order when interests of the “strongest” are in question. The Trump administration instrumentalization of tariffs as a tool of economic coercion, selectively punishing and exempting other nations according to their political compliance to US foreign policy interests exemplifies this situation well. As highlighted by the Vice-Premier of China in his special address to the World Economic Forum earlier this year[8], these practices undermine the multilateral order’s principle of equal-footed negotiations. In other words, our multilateral model of international relations breeds injustice.

Two camps: what to make of our dysfunctional system?

Resulting of the above-outlined issues is an increasing disillusionment in our model of global governance. Note the United States’ incremental disengagement from multiple multilateral institutions: pressuring allies to take up funding for NATO, renouncing climate agreements and relying on unilateral trade measures such as tariffs to further its interests. European countries are accelerating efforts to reduce dependence on the US in industry, trade and military partnerships[9],[10]. Meanwhile, public outcry condemning the international community’s abandonment of civilians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine, Sudan and other conflict zones reflects declining confidence in multilateral institutions as effective guarantors of collective security. The system set up following two world-scale wars in hopes of setting humanity out on a new course has proven deficient. Now in light of these deficiencies we can sketch out two responses, unified in their call for change but diverging in respect to their conception of what should be made of the institutional arrangement itself. These responses I call here – for evident reasons – conservationism and abolitionism. What are these stances and what are their limitations?

The conservationist position is a reaction to the anticipated anarchy of the absence of these structures. Despite cynicism, multilateral institutions still effectively modulate international relations today. The idea of their dissolution evokes a fear of chaos in global governance. From a logic of risk-avoidance and the security of familiarity, conservationists may support institutional reform of the unjust multilateral model, but still find themselves unwilling to renounce it.

By contrast, abolitionism is a radical recognition the limitations of reform, due to of the foundational nature of the institutions’ injustice, as exemplified above by the UN. In that a given institution is grounded in a discriminatory logic, reform is inherently limited. In these cases meaningful change calls not only for treating nefarious symptoms, but for uprooting their cause. Simply put, it is a call to abolish (and replace). The shortcoming, perhaps, of this position is its shortsighted focus on abolition and its inversely insufficient engagement towards building alternatives. I argue that the creation of and, crucially, participation in alternative institutions of international relations effectively diminishes the global dependence on the standard model, and by that very fact undermines its hegemony.

An alternative approach to international cooperation

International cooperation cannot be framed by any formal model. It is an organic occurrence and a proliferating practice marked by its agents’ ingenuity. A diversity of dynamics of international cooperation thrive alongside the frameworks of multilateral institutions. Not only can these substitute the shortcomings of the hegemonic model, they also pre-exist it and oftentimes already outperform it in many regards. Faced with the effects of the crisis of the multilateral model, many states are expanding their approach to international relations to include dynamics beyond those of the multilateral model.

The World Economic Forum’s Global Cooperation Barometer reveals a proliferation of regional, smaller and temporally specific national associations[10]. These tend to be punctual collaborative projects framed by a common issue, between a small number of countries, who may simultaneously be engaging in a multitude of similar associations relating to other concerns with different clusters of countries. As aptly expressed by Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney[11], variable geometry allows different coalitions for different issues based on common values and interests. By contrast to the realities of the multilateral model, this approach to international cooperation would on the one hand increase states’ capacity for principled stands in regards to issues of importance to them[12], and on the other hand reduce their vulnerability to retaliation. This promotes flexible, pragmatic and value-based international cooperation. Importantly, it also makes international cooperative action less dependent on major power approval.

It is undeniable: we are in an era of evolving dynamics of international cooperation. Inherited structures are in crisis, and this may cause a seemingness of disorder. When one only has conscience of the standard model, its disappearance seems to indicate absolute absence of regulation of international relations. This perception may push us towards polarization, isolationism and protectionism. It is crucial that we recognize the existence – indeed the proliferation – and the efficiency of diverse structures of cooperation and collaboration. It is my conviction that such times of radical transformation offer us the rare opportunity to craft the structures of a new global order in pragmatic and principled ways. Here precisely lies our task.

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